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Global warming illustrates, perhaps better than any other environmental
problem, the need for an international coordination of environmental
policy. This need arises from the general inefficiency of uncoordinated
national policies in the presence of transboundary or global pollution
(Markusen, 1975). These inefficiencies are brought about by interna-
tional differences in costs and benefits of implementing environmental
policy. Under an uncoordinated policy environmental efforts are concen-
trated in countries with relatively high benefits from environmental
policy. An efficient allocation requires, on the contrary, that environ-
mental efforts be concentrated in countries with relatively low costs.
This discrepancy motivates the call for environmental treaties. Ef-
ficiency can be brought about under an environmental treaty if it re-
quires the application of a single market instrument, such as a tax or a
tradeable permit system, to the entire domain of the treaty. Pollution
activities then carry the same price tag everywhere, thereby directing
abatement into low and pollution into high abatement cost locations.
There are, however, three problems to be faced when following this
road to efficiency. These problems arise from the fact that countries are
sovereign. Due to sovereignty, countries neither need to participate in a
treaty in the first place, nor need they behave well under it, nor can
they be prevented from overt treason once it is in their interest to
terminate cooperation for good.
Quite fortunately, there exists a simple solution which, in theory,
can be applied to all these problems: Side-payments to countries out of
the pool of total international efficiency gains. With respect to the firstproblem, side-payments can be used to bribe a country into an agree-
ment. With respect to the second, they can be used to guide a country
to a desirable behaviour within the bounds of a contract. And lastly,
they can be used as a carrot to keep a country inside a treaty it other-
wise would vacate.
However, the universal application of side-payments in international
relations appears to be severely limited. Country sovereignty is there-
fore in practice a more serious obstacle to the emergence, succes and
survival of environmental agreements than in theory. There are a
number of reasons why the applicability of international side-payments is
limited.
In order to stabilise a treaty, side-payments need to flow from high
benefit and cost locations to low benefit and cost locations thereby
disregarding in general and violating in practice the polluter-pays princ-
iple. Side-payments seem therefore to carry the stigma of bribes and
blackmail. They cannot therefore easily survive in the domestic political
process leading up to a treaty.
Beyond that, even if side-payments are accepted in principle their
use may be restricted; or the game theorists' blueprint recommendations
may be extensively revised and modified. The side-payments ultimately
chosen may therefore be inadequate in magnitude to resolve the sov-
ereignty problem.
A further obstacle is the substantial uncertainty surrounding most
international environmental problems. New information on the distribution
of gains and losses may emerge, requiring a revision of payments
planned. However, once side-payments are fixed they may turn out
difficult to adjust. Such an inflexibility can even be necessary to avoid apermanent quarrel about the distribution of surpluses and to prevent
strategic behaviour in the presence of asymmetric information.
Lastly, fiscal restrictions may put a lid on total side-payments well
below the theoretical potential. This discrepancy may emerge because
side-payments are usually to be made in money terms and by a donor
government. On the contrary the benefits from an environmental treaty
will in general also fall onto the private sector and materialise also in
utility terms. If the donor country cannot (costlessly) tax away all these
private gains some of the total surplus to be gained from a treaty is not
available for redistribution.
For these reasons it seems warranted to take a pessimistic view with
respect to an easy resolution of the sovereignty problem with help of
side-payments. This view is taken in this paper.
We investigate into an environmental treaty under which exogenously
given side-payments need not necessarily suffice to guarantee its sus-
tainability. Under sustainability of a treaty we understand its long-term
survival despite country sovereignty. Tackling such a situation it
becomes interesting to ask which factors, other than (additional or lack
of) side-payments, contribute to or are detrimental to sustainability.
Amongst other things it is to be expected that the nature of inter-
national links other than environmental cooperation influences a sov-
ereign's incentive to stick to or pull out of an international environ-
mental treaty. One such additional link is international borrowing. The
impact of this link on the sustainability of an environmental treaty is
analysed in this paper. International inter temporal trade is interesting in
this context for several reasons.
Empirically, the investigation of international indebtedness can be
motivated by the nature of international environmental problems. Thesefrequently require the participation of LDCs. LDCs are heavily in-
debted, with the party of international lenders (industrialised countries)
being accidentally or systematically identical to the party which requests
environmental cooperation. A full understanding of the problem of sus-
tainability of an environmental treaty therefore also requires an under-
standing of the relationship between intertemporal trade and international
environmental cooperation. This relationship is rich.
Income generated from the international redistribution of the gains
from environmental cooperation alleviates the net debt burden of LDCs
(Bertram, Stephens and Wallace, 1989). In turn environmental tax pay-
ments or permit imports of industrialised countries reduce their balance
of payments surplus with respect to LDCs.
Beyond that country sovereignty itself adds a potentially important
and particularly interesting aspect. Country sovereignty not only poses
a problem to an environmental treaty, it can also be exerted with respect
to foreign debt. The paradigm of country sovereignty has been exten-
sively applied to international debt itself (e.g. Aizenman, 1989; Bulow
and Rogoff, 1989; Cohen and Sachs, 1986; Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981;
Grossman and Van Huyck, 1988; and Kletzer, 1984). However, the joint
existence of sovereignty with respect to debt and other international
contracts has drawn little attention.
Considering the sovereign debt link jointly with the sustainability
problem of an environmental treaty implies that countries simultaneously
face two strategic links. And the nature of international relations de-
pends on the nature of the interrelationship between these links.
If the debt game and the environmental game are strategically in-
dependent, then a country can violate an environmental treaty while
maintaining good debtor-creditor relations and vice versa. Neverthelessinternational debt influences the sustainability of an environmental treaty
by affecting the conditions under which the environmental game is
played.
However, strategic independence need not necessarily hold. If the
sovereignty decision with respect to either game affects the sovereignty
options available with respect to the other game, the games are inter-
connected (Folmer et al. , 1991). For example, if a country cannot re-
pudiate debt without at the same time also violating the environmental
treaty and vice versa we have in fact a single international game. In
this case the fate of the environmental treaty hinges on the overall
incentive of a country to maintain "good" international relations. A
disincentive to stay within the environmental treaty may then be out-
weighed by the incentive to maintain good creditor-borrower relations.
The paper addresses these issues. To keep the analysis simple a
stylised world with only two countries is considered. However, the
sovereignty problem of only one of them is investigated. By convention
it is presumed that this is the debtor country. Also by convention, let
the debtor country be the foreign country. Furthermore it is presumed
that the environmental objective of the treaty is implemented with a
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tradeable permit scheme. Side-payments to a country are made indi-
rectly by way of an exogenously given and hence potentially insufficient
initial allocation of permits. In particular it is presumed that the country
whose sovereignty poses a threat to the sustainability of the treaty
receives more permits than it needs to cover domestic emissions. Hence
the analysis is concerned with the risks to the sustainability of an
international tradeable permit scheme arising from the sovereignty of an
internationally indebted net exporter of permits.7
II. The Model
The analytical framework is a two country world with overlapping gener-
ations of the Samuelson (1958) - Diamond (1965) type. International
intertemporal trade is caused by differences in preferences (Buiter,
1981) or technology (Schmid, 1987). Two generations live in each period,
the young and the old. Generation t, consisting of L households, enters
the economy at the beginning of period t and disappears from the econ-
omy at the end of period t+1. Each young member of generation t works
in period t, receives a wage w, which is used for youth consumption,
c
J, lending, -b, and investment into the malleable capital stock of period
t+1, k-. In period t+1 when old, a member of generation t retires from
work and finances old age consumption, c , from interest earnings out of
the provision of real capital and loans, and from dissaving. Technology
is given by a Cobb-Douglas production function in which capital and
labour is employed to produce a single consumption-cum-capital good,
implying per capita output f(k) as a function of the per capita real
capital stock, k. We take it that international debt is bond-financed.
4
Let L=L*. To represent growth, let n denote the one period pro-
portional rate of growth of successive generations in both countries.
Hence L-=(l+n)
>L.
Environmental damage is represented by emission functions
e = h-k
(1)
e* = h*-k*where h and h* are constant, h<h*, h, h*>o. That is, per capita emis-
sions in period t, e, are proportional to per capita capital employed in
period t in the production process.
Suppose the two countries agree to impose an international tradeable
permit scheme in order to reduce emissions. Suppose permits are valid
only in one period and each permit entitles the owner to one unit of
emissions. It will be presumed that capital owners are made responsible
for emissions in that period in which capital is employed in production.
Required permits must be purchased when investment into real capital is
undertaken. Under these assumptions a young household in the home
country must purchase h-(l+n)-k.. permits when investing (l+n)-k.. at
the end of period t, to cover h*k1 emissions per member of generation
t+1 in period t+1.
The specification of the emission technology (equations 1) and the
requirement to purchase permits in the period before they are needed
for covering emissions catches in a simple way two important factors
which can potentially endanger the sustainability of any environmental
treaty: (i) Development (in the model investment in the future capital
stock) conflicts with environmental protection, thereby increasing the
costs of international cooperation, (ii) Abiding by the stipulations of the
treaty in the course of development requires front end investment in
environmental protection (i.e. holding permits in advance), thereby
unfavourably affecting the returns on development.
Suppose the tradeable permit scheme restricts average emissions of
the world community to e. In the two country world of size 2>L this
imposes the global emission restriction(2) 2 i > h-k + h-*-k*
\
To sustain the emission target in each period (l+n)*2-e new permits
must be supplied to the world economy in each period. Suppose this is
achieved by providing each young household in the home country with
an "equitable" endowment (1-A) • (1+n) -e and each household abroad with
an endowment (1+X)•(1+n)*e, where -1<X<1. The parameter X may be
interpreted as the equitability spread from an egalitarian distribution of
permits. Given the price p paid in period t for permits valid to cover
emissions in period t+1, the permit endowment raises youth income above
the wage rate w and w* to w+(l-X)•(1+n)-e-p and w*+(l+X) • (1+n)'e*p.
Given this tradeable permit scheme, consumption when young and













J = w* + (l+X)-(l+n)-e-p + b* - (l+n)-k* - h*•(1+n)-k*-p
and
c° = (l+n)-(l+r )-k - (1+rVb
(4
) o* i*
c = (l+n)«(l+r*)-k* - (l+rj" )-b*
The first three terms on the RHS of equations (3) represent the sources
of disposable funds when young: wage income, permit endowment and
borrowing (if b, b*>0). The last three terms on the RHS of (3) represent
the use of disposable income besides consumption: lending (if b, b*<0),
investment and the purchase of permits to cover emissions in period t+1.10
Old age consumption in the two countries is augmented by investment
into the domestic capital stock with marginal physical return r_,
r1=f (k1), at home and r?, r*=f*'(k*), abroad. It is further increased by
lending (if b, b*<0) or decreased by borrowing (if b,b*>0). The interna-
tional component in households' portfolios, debt or loans, bears an
interest rate r. at home and r* abroad. Household preferences in each
country are given by well-behaved utility functions U(c, c ) and
•j* o*
U*(c
J ,c ). Throughout we will presume that the environment is a
public good to be provided by an environmental treaty.
As the tradeable permit scheme fixes allowable emissions, if the
scheme is a binding constraint under the treaty, then environmental
quality is constant for as long as the treaty sustains. However, if the
country in question pulls out, world emissions are larger, possibly
reducing utility of foreign households. These costs of quitting coop-
eration could be represented by letting environmental quality be an
argument of household utility. An alternative approach, followed here,
is to count these costs directly against the benefits from violating the
treaty.
It will be presumed that all decisions are made under conditions of
perfect competition.11
III. The Sovereignty Restrictions
Under sovereignty, instead of a country's ability it is its willingness to
honour a contract which is critical for its fate. Having two (sets of)
contracts which can be imperilled by the execution of sovereignty,
several restrictions may have to be imposed on the economy. The number
of restrictions, however, depends on the nature of the relationship
between these (sets of) contracts. Until we revise this assumption in
Section VI it will be presumed that debt contracts and the environmental
contract are strategically independent. That is, it will be presumed that
debt contracts can be violated while the environmental agreement is
honoured and vice versa. Under strategic independence there exist two
restrictions arising from sovereignty, one for the set of debt contracts
and one for the permit scheme.
These restrictions will depend on the relative strength of incentives
to break or honour a contract. In general these incentives can be both
public and private. For simplicity, however, in what follows only private
incentives will be considered.
Determining a foreign household's costs from a continued partici-
pation in the environmental treaty, the treaty's impact on returns on
investment must be determined. Without the treaty an investment of 1
unit of the good in period t bears a return of 1+r* in period t+1. That
investment causes, however, h* additional emissions. Hence, under the
treaty a foreign household is required to forsake p-h* additional units of
consumption in order to invest one unit. Hence under the treaty the ef-
fective return on investment is (l+r*)/(l+h*-p). Therefore foreign
households need to accept under the treaty a discount on the rate of
return.12
To determine the sovereignty restriction for the permit scheme
consider the following intertemporal arbitrage options a foreign household
possesses in case the foreign country honours the contract and in case
the contract is violated. If the contract is honoured in period t, then
generation t has to bear costs (1+n) «h* •k1 * -p in period t. Alternatively,
if the contract is breached in period t this amount could be invested,
without having to acquire permits. This would yield
[ (1+n) «h* *k * *p] • (l+r1 *). This breach of contract would be associated
with a loss of (1+A)•(1+n)*e*p in permit income. This, if invested under
the rules of the permit scheme, would yield
[ (1+X) • (1+n) -e *p] • (l+r*)/(l+h* -p). Hence under consideration of this
investment arbitrage the net discounted (period t) value of not breach-
ing the contract in period t is given by
- (l+n)-h*-k*-p
The value of honouring the treaty is further increased if a violation
is associated with additional costs. These can arise from economic sanc-
tions and environmental degradation caused by a pullout of the treaty.
For simplicity let these costs be specific to a violation of the environ-
Q
mental treaty and let them be proportional to economic output. If 6.,
6^2.0, is the proportionality factor linking economic activity with costs
from both sanctions and environmental degradation, then the treaty will
be honoured in period t if4es Institute fur Welfwirtschdft
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(5) [(l+A)-(l+n)-e-p]/(l+h*-p] - (1+n)-h*-k*-p
Restriction (5) gives the condition under which it is optimal for the
foreign country not to violate the treaty in period t. In the following we
will be concerned with steady states in which k=k1 for all t. In a
steady state condition (5) ensures that the treaty is honoured forever.
This is because in a steady state a necessary and sufficient condition
that a contract is honoured forever is that it is not violated today.
Hence under steady-state conditions restriction (5) must be fulfilled in
order for the environmental treaty to be sustainable.
The sovereignty restriction (5) suggests that a treaty violation is in
general not prevented by turning a country into a net exporter of
permits, i.e. by having (1+A) -e-h* *k*>0. This is due to the non-neu-
trality of the treaty with respect to returns on investment in environ-
mentally harmful capital.
Let us now turn to the sovereignty restriction for the world debt
market. It will be presumed that a violation of debt contracts is asso-
ciated with an immediate cutoff from new loans. These costs of a debt
contract violation may be further enlarged by economic sanctions. Sup-
pose again that sanctions are specific to a debt contract violation, and
suppose they are proportional to output, with proportionality factor £„,
62>0.
Debt service obligations with respect to past borrowing are given in
period t by b*_1*(l+r *). Honouring debt, however, preserves access to
the world credit market in period t. As compared to period t-1 there are14
(1+n) times as many households in period t, the foreign country receives
(l+n)-b* per member of generation t-1 if debt is honoured in period t.
Economic sanctions increase the incentive to honour debt by
(1+n) -6~ 'f*(k*) - per member of generation t-1. It is optimal for the
foreign country to honour debt in period t if
(6) b*1-(l+r










follows in the steady state in which b* =b*.
The LHS of condition (7) is the steady-state net debt obligation of
the foreign country per period. If it is positive, debt repudiation can
only be prevented if the net debt obligation is exceeded by the costs of
economic sanctions. Again, if the condition for honouring debt in
period t is fulfilled in the steady state, then debt is never repudiated.
We are now ready to investigate the impact of international debt on
the s us tainabil ity of the treaty.15
IV. From Financial Autarky to Non-Sovereign Borrowing
Suppose in an initial situation the environmental treaty is in operation
but intertemporal trade cannot take place. Suppose it is a steady state.
Under the treaty returns on investment in the two countries are given
by (l+r)/(l+h-p) and (l+r*)/(l+h*-p). As intertemporal trade does not
take place returns on investment will in general differ across countries.
Let
(8) 1+h-p l+h*-p
Suppose the distribution of world capital and of permits is such that
(9) e > (1-A) -e
That is, emissions in the home country are too large to be covered by
the home country's initial permit allocation. Hence permits must be
imported from abroad. The foreign country earns therefore an income
from permit exports. Finally suppose these exports are large enough to
ensure that restriction (5) is fulfilled. In other words, suppose the en-
vironmental treaty is sustainable under financial autarky. In the remain-
der of this section we shall compare the autarky steady state with a
steady state in which intertemporal trade takes place.16
Continue to suppose that the treaty is subject to country sover-
eignty. But assume, as an intermediate step, that a country cannot
exert sovereignty with respect to debt.
Under non-sovereign borrowing and lending debtors service debt to
the limit of their ability. The ability to service debt imposes a limit on
how much can be borrowed. Let this solvency restriction be b, b>o.
Now open non-sovereign intertemporal trade. Because of (8) it is
beneficial for domestic households to hold claims against the foreign
economy and for foreign households to hold liabilities against the dom-
estic economy in their portfolios. Hence, because of (8) the foreign
country raises debt in the home country.
Consumption smoothing then requires from foreign households to
invest at least some of the debt raised to finance additional old age
consumption. Likewise, domestic households smooth consumption by
divesting some of their domestic real capital holdings. The capital stock
increases abroad and decreases at home.
Because of equation (4) a foreign household can service debt when-
ever c *>o. For well behaved preferences over youth and old age con-
sumption it is optimal for households to have positive old age consump-
tion. Hence b*<b. That is, the solvency restriction is non-binding.
Foreign households are unconstrained on international loan markets.
As loan markets are unconstrained by the solvency restriction,
capital will be shifted from the home country into the foreign country
until returns on capital are the same at home and abroad. Therefore in
the unconstrained debt steady state17
1+h-p l+h*-p
with b*<b.
Consider now the impact of non-sovereign borrowing and lending on
the sustainability of the treaty. Compared to the autarky situation (8)
intertemporal trade has decreased the capital stock at home and in-
creased the capital stock abroad. In turn domestic economic activity and
hence emissions have decreased and foreign economic activity and
emissions have increased. Compared to financial autarky the foreign
country must now hold more and the home country needs to hold only
fewer permits. Hence the foreign country can export fewer permits.
This decline in the quantity of permits exported is ceteris paribus
detrimental to the overall incentive of the foreign country to honour the
treaty. Hence as a consequence of opening intertemporal trade the sov-
ereignty restriction (5) may be violated. In conclusion, unconstrained
borrowing and lending can imperil the sustainability of an environmental
treaty.
However, this need not necessarily be the case. Other factors, for
example the elasticity of the permit price, have an impact on the sus-
tainability of the treaty too. This ambiguity need not surprise. As is the
case with any other restriction imposed on an economy, sovereignty re-
strictions are either binding or not.
It is, however, worth bearing in mind for future reference that
under the assumptions made so far there is no systematic link between
the private sector's decision making problem and the sustainability of the18
treaty. There are no private incentives to sustain the treaty. The pro-
vision of sustainability remains a public good.
V. From Non-Sovereign to Sovereign Borrowing
So far we have disregarded the sovereignty problem on debt markets. If
the foreign country is sovereign with respect to debt also, lenders will
set a credit limit such that restriction (6) will never be violated. Let
this credit limit be b.
If b is a non-binding constraint on the foreign economy, foreign house-
holds can raise debt, and capital is shifted from the home country
abroad, until the rates of return on investment are the same in both
countries. Hence if country sovereignty is a non-binding constraint on
debt markets, the steady state is characterised by (10), with b*<b.
Sovereignty over debt obligations affects the world economy only if the
incentive of lenders to protect their loans cuts off borrowers from de-
sired additional loans.
In case sovereignty is a binding constraint on debt markets bor-
rowers are constrained by 6 before the difference in rates of returns on
investment disappears. Hence in a steady state constrained by debtor
sovereignty
(ID 1+h-p l+h*-p
with b* = b.19
In order to investigate the impact of debtor sovereignty on the
sustainability of the treaty suppose, for sake of argument, that in the
non-sovereign debt steady state the treaty is not sustainable.
Compared to the non-sovereign debt steady state (10), less capital
has been shifted from the home country abroad in the steady state (11).
The capital stock in the lender economy is larger and in the debtor
economy it is smaller than under unrestricted borrowing and lending.
Consequently the debtor country can export more permits. Ceteris
paribus the incentive of the debtor country to honour the treaty has
increased. Hence a treaty which is not sustainable under non-sovereign
borrowing may be sustainable if country sovereignty effectively con-
strains international borrowing and lending.
The mechanism which is responsible for this potentially stabilising
effect warrants close attention. If economic activity (development) is
detrimental to the environment, and if a treaty sets market incentives
such that environmental degradation is punished, then development is
detrimental to the incentive of a country to honour the treaty. Access to
international capital spurs development and consequently is detrimental to
overcoming the sovereignty problem of the treaty. However, the same
sovereignty problem restrains access to international capital and there-
fore indirectly contributes to its alleviation in the sphere of environ-
mental cooperation.
Interestingly, if the sovereignty problem encompasses both public
(environmental) and private (financial) international relations the public
good " sustainability of the treaty" may (partially) be provided by the
private sector. Alas, the private provision is sufficient for sustainability
only by chance. This motivates a search for possible institutional ar-
rangements which could make the private provision of this public good
systematically sufficient.20
VI. Cross-Default Clauses and the Sustainability of Treaties
The analysis in the previous sections shows that the sustainability of an
environmental treaty is affected by international borrowing and lending.
In particular, lenders exert a potentially stabilising effect on the treaty
in the wake of actions meant to manage their own exposure to country
sovereignty. This private contribution to the provision of a public good
can be systematically exploited.
This can be achieved by strategically linking the debt with the
treaty game. This linkup can be made by a suitable contract between the
parties which each and individually face a sovereignty problem with
respect to a common third party. This contract is designed such that the
third party has only the options of violating all obligations against all
members to the contract or honouring all. This constract is therefore a
cross-default clause. As a consequence of such a cross-default clause
the sovereign is deprived of all options of discriminating between indi-
vidual obligations.
In the present model such a cross-default clause would be an agree-
ment between the government of the home country, which supports the
treaty for environmental reasons (the net importer of permits), and the
group of lenders. Under the cross-default clause a sovereign's debt
i*
service payment (1+r ) *b* and the payment made to purchase the nec-
essary quantity of permits (1+n) *h* -k* -p are pooled. The pool is jointly
held by the parties to the cross-default clause. If total payments made
i* are short of (1+r ) -b*+(l+n) -h* *k* -p, lenders and the home government
share arrears. Hence under the cross-default clause the sovereign is
forced to either honour both the treaty and debt or default on both.
Under a cross default clause there is a single sovereignty restriction
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in the model. It is given in the steady state by21
l+h*-p
> (1+n)*h*-k*'p + b*-(l+r
1 )
The cross-default sovereignty restriction (12) allows for a substitution
between insufficient incentives to honour the treaty and more than
sufficient incentives to honour debt and vice versa.
In the model, under the cross-default clause the treaty is always
sustainable. This is achieved because lenders protecting the value of
their loans set a credit limit b such that restriction (12) is never
violated. The public good "sustainability of the treaty" is provided on an
entirely private basis.
Who benefits from a cross-default clause? To answer this question we
must distinguish between certainty and risk, and in case of risk between
ex ante and ex post.
Under the model assumptions (certainty) the party interested in the
treaty's sustainability (the home country government) benefits from a
cross-default clause in situations in which the treaty would be violated
otherwise. Under the model assumptions lenders are competitive and
therefore obtain a return on loans equal to the return on other assets.
Lenders are therefore indifferent as to the portfolio composition. As from
the point of view of a competitive lender a cross-default clause affects
only the amount which can be lent, he or she must be indifferent
concerning the introduction of the clause. Neither party to the clause
will therefore vetoe it.
Matters are, however, more complicated if we depart from the model
assumption and allow for risk associated we debt and the treaty. In this22
case we have to distinguish between ex post and ex ante too, where ex
post refers to the (point in) time when loans have been already made,
the treaty has been already signed but the state of world to is not yet
known.
Ex post the purpose of the clause is not to prevent default in all
states of the world. Rather, with stakes outstanding, the purpose is to
reduce the risk affecting the parties to the clause. Ex post lenders will
benefit from it if the risk of default on debt outstanding is smaller
under the clause than without it. Similarly the party interested in the
sustainability of the treaty will benefit from the clause if it reduces the
treaty's risk. Apparently, in order for the clause to be ex post bene-
ficial for both parties the risk of debt and the treaty's risk cannot be
"too" different. Otherwise either party would object against taking on
board the bad risk brought into the clause by the other party. If the
risk properties are similar a clause can be introduced.
A cross-default clause can be beneficial beyond reducing the sov-
ereignty risk. It substantially improves the otherwise at best modest
incentives to implement debt-for-nature swaps. Under strategic inde-
pendence of debt and the environmental treaty lenders themselves do not
benefit from a swap beyond what they would gain from pure debt relief.
However, under a cross-default clause, debt and the treaty are strategi-
cally dependent such that the risk of debt is reduced if the risk of the
treaty is. Hence lenders benefit from a suitable swap more than from
debt relief. Under a clause lenders want to become active participants in
swaps. Thereby they take away the sole burden from non-profit environ-
mental organisations and governments in financing them.23
Does the sovereign benefit from a cross-default clause? There are
two opposing effects affecting the ex post utility of the sovereign. By
the introduction of a clause the sovereign loses some options it would
take in some states of the world. This reduces the sovereign's utility.
Contrary to this effect works, however, the lenders' newly gained
incentive to trade debt reduction against environmental protection. Hence
the ex post effect of the clause on the sovereign's utility is ambiguous.
Does the anticipation of a clause diminish the sovereign's incentive to
join a treaty in the first place? This ex ante incentive does not only
depend on the ex post effects of an (anticipated) cross-default clause. It
also depends on ex ante effects too. For example, a clause reduces the
risk of future debt. The risk premium to be charged by lenders when
making the loan will therefore be smaller. The cost of borrowing there-
fore declines in anticipation of a clause. In sum, these effects can either
negatively or positively affect the sovereign's utility.
An anticipated utility reduction needs, however, not diminish the
chances of getting the country on board of a treaty. Although ex post it
cannot block the clause as it is not a party to it, ex ante it is a poten-
tial party to the treaty. Hence it can join the treaty on the condition
that the clause shall not be introduced. Furthermore, in anticipation of a
future clause it continues to have available the outside option of not
joining the treaty. Hence in principle, a sovereign cannot be forced to
accept an expected utility below the utility it would enjoy without the
treaty. Furthermore, it can arrange for utility to be no less than the
utility it would receive under the treaty if the clause were not available.
Consequently a country will join a treaty whenever it would do so with-
out the availability of the clause.24
This result hinges, however, on strong information assumptions, a
hypothesis which is unlikely to hold in reality. Further research in the
properties of the cross-default clause policy instrument is therefore
needed.
VII. A Trade-off between Sustainability and Efficiency
The original motivation for and ultimate purpose of environmental treaties
is, at the minimum, economic efficiency of environmental policy. Unfortu-
nately, the efficiency properties of market instruments when applied in a
domestic setting do not always survive in an international setting.
Consider for example the present model. Efficiency requires that the
marginal permit be channelled into coverage of those emissions which
emanate from investments with the highest return. Notice that under
non-sovereign or sovereign but unconstrained borrowing rates of returns
on investment are identical in both countries (see equality (10)). Hence
under unrestricted inter temporal trade the treaty brings about efficiency
in international environmental policy.
Now consider the sovereignty-constrained steady-state (11). As rates
of return on domestic investment are exceeded by rates of return on
foreign investment efficiency would require from permit markets to
channel more permits into the more productive foreign economy. How-
ever, this does not happen. This is because the foreign economy neither
creates additional capital-cum-emissions (to be covered by additional
permits) out of additional savings nor can it raise additional capital
abroad. Hence under sovereignty-restricted borrowing and lending the
treaty is inefficient.25
This result is an example of a second-best problem. If another
market is imperfect (the debt market) it need not be optimal selecting a
first best policy instrument for the environmental problem. This is not
surprising. It is nevertheless troublesome for environmental policy
making that the very institutional arrangement designed to resolve an
international efficiency problem can fail exactly because the situation is
international.
Interestingly there can be a trade-off between the sustainability and
the efficiency objective. The free intertemporal trade steady state (10) is
efficient but the treaty may not be sustainable. The sovereignty-restric-
ted debt steady state (11) is inefficient but the treaty may be sus-
tainable even if it is not sustainable under unconstrained borrowing.
This trade-off, which is exogenous to policy making under strategic
independence, causes a serious policy problem if sustainability is to be
systematically brought about by a cross-default clause. Following this
avenue to sustainability the loss of efficiency is. the costs of ensuring
the survival of the treaty.
This trade-off reduces the attractiveness of the cross-default
approach. . However, it is not due to it. Rather, the underlying
mechanism will remain valid if, instead, other stabilisation instruments,
e.g. side payments, are applied. If emissions are tied to physical capital
and the allocation of the latter is restricted such as is the case in a
sovereignty constrained world capital market, then international environ-
mental policy is inefficient.
Nor is this inefficiency due to the tradeable permit instrument. If
the treaty is instead implemented by way of an international environ-
mental tax system (with tax rate p) it remains inefficient if borrowers
are sovereignty constrained.26
Nor is it unique to the specific form of financing. For example, if
debt financing is substituted by foreign direct investment the sov-
ereignty problem survives in the form of an expropriation risk to direct
investment. Although investors apply also other techniques in protecting
the value of their investment, an important technique is capital rationing
for a reasoning similar to that applied by lenders. Hence capital mobility
remains restricted. A treaty under which market instruments of environ-
mental policy are applied cannot therefore bring about an efficient allo-
cation of pollution.
The potential inefficiency of an environmental treaty in face of
country sovereignty will not hold anymore if emissions are independent
from capital formation. However, for some pressing environmental
problems this inefficiency problem must be faced. :
A point in case is an international CO~ policy. CO_ emissions are
roughly proportional to energy input, which, given energy efficiency,
rises with the level of economic activity. The latter, in turn increases
with the capital stock of an economy. Given an optimal fuel mix, putting
a lid on CO« emissions therefore puts restrictions on capital formation
and development. Therefore, the arguments put forth in the analysis of
the model can be applied to CO-.
The CO- efficiency problem hence is not only to get LDCs up to
energy efficiency standards. Nor is it only to make permits move out of
LDCs and into the industrialised world. The efficiency of CO- policies
also requires capital to move out of the industrialised world and into
debtor countries which face capital shortages, in order to take advantage
of high rates of return there. Hence in a world with imperfect internat-
ional capital markets, resolving the debt stalemate and making debt
markets more efficient also contributes to a more efficient allocation of
greenhouse gas emissions.27
VIII. Summary
In this paper we investigate the impact of international debt on the
sustainability of an environmental treaty. In this context sustainability
refers to the continued participation of a country in a treaty, despite
the fact, that due to being sovereign a country can pull out of a treaty
at any time. Side payments, by assumption, cannot be applied to ensure
sustainability. Furthermore it is assumed that sovereignty not only
affects the sustainability of a treaty but also intertemporal trade.
It is shown that free intertemporal trade can be detrimental to the
sustainability of a treaty. Counter to this effect works, however, an
effect emanating from the desire of lenders to protect the value of their
loans against debt repudiation. As a consequence a treaty may be sus-
tainable which, without this protective behaviour on the supply side of
international debt, were not. This private contribution to the provision
of the public good "sustainability" is, however, sufficient only by chance
if international debt and the environmental treaty are strategically in-
dependent.
By the introduction of a cross-default clause international debt and
an environmental treaty can be strategically linked. Such a clause is a
contract between the party which has a vested interest in the sustain-
ability of the treaty and the party of international lenders. Under the
clause the sovereign has only the option of honouring both debt and the
treaty or defaulting on both. Under such a cross-default clause and
under certainty lenders will impose a credit limit such that the treaty is
always sustainable. There is no need for further public action. It is,
however, argued that under risk the applicability of cross-default
clauses is restricted.28
It is also shown that the efficiency property of market instruments
of environmental policy need not necessarily survive if they are applied
internationally. In particular, it is shown that it is lost if country
sovereignty also poses a problem on international debt markets in con-
junction with emissions rising with economic activity. This adds, for
example, to the plethora of difficulties in designing an efficient inter-
national COp policy for which it is indispensable to bring heavily in-
debted LDCs into a climate treaty.29
Notes:
Global warming is, again, a particularly revealing point in case (see
e.g. Grubb, 1989).
See e.g. Bohm, 1991; Grubb and Sebenius, 1991; Heister et al. ,
1991; Pearce, 1990; and Whalley and Wigle, 1990.
To simplify notation, variables without a time index refer to
period t. Hence, L, for example relates to the size of generation t
and L. to the size of generation t+i.
4
By convention, let all unasterisked parameters and variables relate
to the home country and all asterisked variables to the foreign
country.
Equations (1) may be interpreted as a crude approximation to the
current CO- emission technology.
6 See Mohr, 1991a.
For an analysis of public incentives to break a permit scheme under
conditions of financial autarky see Mohr (1991b).
a
Expressing environmental costs in terms of goods is reasonable if en-
vironmental damage can be monetised. Furthermore, the proportion-
ality hypothesis is reasonable if environmental costs have to be30
borne mainly in production. See e.g. Nordhaus (1991) for an attempt
to calculate the costs of forsaking greenhouse gas abatement in terms
of percentage losses of US output.
9
It is supposed that all costs of contract violations which are pro-
portional to economic activity are additive. For an alternative hy-
pothesis see Mohr (1991a).
Incentive deficits in implementing debt-for-nature swaps have been
widely acknowledged in the literature (e.g. Occhiolini, 1990).
Under country sovereinty, financing (bond-, bank credit financing
or direct investment) is, however, not neutral. It affects the inter-
national allocation of capital (see Mohr 1991c). Under strategic
independence the sustainability of a treaty is therefore affected by
the kind of financing of foreign capital.31
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